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There is a good deal of evidence showing that person-
ality questionnaires are fakeable. Impressive evidence was 
first given by Viswesvaran and Ones (1999), but also since 
then, in particular by Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore, Bran-
nick, and Smith (2006), Deller, Ones, Viswesvaran, and 
Dilchert (2006), and Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hol-
lenbeck, Murphy, and Schmitt (2007a). In this paper, the 
phenomenon of faking good – especially in the context of 
job recruitment – is of prime interest, though faking bad also 
occurs within a clinical context (for a review, cf. Franke, 
2002). Most studies on this topic use some kind of instruc-
tion to fake, which might be the reason why practition-
ers do not take these results into account. They argue that 
experimental behavior is different from behavior within a 
job recruiting procedure. Sometimes it is even argued that 
faking indicates a kind of social competence and is ben-
eficial within recruiting (cf. for instance Marcus, 2003), 
or that faking is not harmful because everybody fakes and 
thus only the mean score is altered (cf. Kanning & Holling, 
2001). Of course, there is no reason to trust so-called lying 
scales, given that these have proven to be fakeable as well 
(cf. Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992). Although it is easy to 
counter these claims with various arguments, their discus-
sion is of little relevance to this paper and only two such ar-
guments will be mentioned. Firstly, social competence in no 
way guarantees that the original personality traits, which the 
questionnaire aimed to measure, are still given satisfacto-
rily, while loyalty to the company is undermined. Secondly, 
the differing behavior of different people is disregarded and 
therefore candidates who do not fake or who fake less are at 
a disadvantage.  
The question is no longer whether examinees actually 
fake in answering a questionnaire, but rather what psycho-
logical means are at psychology’s disposal to conceptualize 
personality questionnaires that are – for the most part – able 
to prevent an examinee from faking. In answering this ques-
tion, the results of two experiments will be presented.
EXPERIMENT I:  
The use of an analog scale response format
Instead of a traditional response format, such as the di-
chotomous (forced choice) response format in particular, an 
analog scale can be used in personality questionnaires. In 
this way, an examinee has the freedom to grade his/her an-
swer to the given statement of an item on a continuum, bor-
dered by two extreme verbalizations (“yes” vs. “no”; “right” 
vs. “wrong”, and the like). If a computer is used for test 
administration, even then at least 150 (invisible) pixels on 
a line provide an almost infinite number of optional answer 
categories. Applying both analog scale response format and 
dichotomous response format, Karner (2002) established an 
Klaus D. Kubinger, Division of Psychological Assessment and Applied 
Psychometrics, Center of Testing and Consulting, Faculty of Psychol-
ogy, University of Vienna. Liebiggasse 5, A-1010 Vienna, Austria. 
E-mail: klaus.kubinger@univie.ac.at (the address for correspondence).
Three more attempts to prevent faking good in personality questionnaires 
KLAUS D. KUBINGER
This paper describes the attempt to prevent faking good in personality questionnaires by several (new) means. 
Firstly, an analog response format was used instead of forced choice or another categorical response format; results 
based on the replication of an earlier experiment are presented. Secondly, the hypothesis that an “over-kill” number 
of items cause an examinee to finally give up faking good was considered. Thirdly, the hypothesis was tested that 
faking good can be prevented by use of a warning instruction stating that the computer is able to identify whether or 
not an examinee’s answers fit a realistic personality profile. Both the latter hypotheses were investigated and rejected 
in another experiment. The same is true as concerns the replication of the experiment applying an analog response 
format. However, it is argued that the experiments described in this paper use volunteers as subjects; evidence is 
given that answering behavior changes considerably, depending on whether an examinee is a job applicant or merely 
a volunteer.  
Key words: personality questionnaire, faking good, faking instruction, analog response format, experiment
116
KUBINGER, Faking good in personality questionnaires, Review of Psychology, 2009, Vol. 16, No. 2, 115-121
important phenomenon: psychometric analyses of the same 
questionnaire (MBTI; Myers-Briggs Type Indicator – Ger-
man edition, Bents & Blank, 1995) disclosed that when 
administered with the original dichotomous response for-
mat, the questionnaire’s scales failed to fit the Rasch model. 
When, however, the test was administered with an analog 
scale response format and the responses subsequently were 
dichotomized, the Rasch model held. This meant that a large 
number of items were necessarily deleted (in order to estab-
lish at least a-posteriori Rasch model fit) in the former case, 
and almost no items in the latter case. Although the study 
did not refer specifically to faking, it did indicate that a di-
chotomous response format is likely to produce measures 
which are not unidimensional. The opposite is the case with 
an analog scale response format, that is, on the whole, this 
format actually measures unidimensionally. One can think 
of: the dichotomous response format probably encourages 
an examinee to use a specific answering strategy, so that the 
resulting score is not a fair indication of the characteristic 
which was intended to be measured. In other words, only 
the freedom to grade his/her responses seems to motivate an 
examinee to answer homogeneously.
A consequent hypothesis is that the dichotomous re-
sponse format offers no challenge to the examinee if he/she 
tries to fake, but that the analog scale response format does 
make it difficult to strategically decide which particular 
grade of response sounds truthful but nevertheless tends 
towards what is socially desirable (personal advantage). A 
faking instruction experiment by Kubinger (2002) actually 
established a significant interaction effect for one of the four 
scales (“agreeableness”) from a Big Five-like adjective list 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was administered to 151 
psychology students – the faking instruction was “to imag-
ine the challenge of undergoing a university admissions test 
for psychology,” the neutral instruction was “to be aware 
that personality inventories are only useful if an examinee 
responds truthfully.” The mean score within the randomized 
group to which the dichotomous response format had been 
administered was lower when examinees were addition-
ally (randomly) confronted with the faking instruction than 
when they were confronted with the neutral instruction. The 
opposite was true for the group to which the analog scale 
response format had been administered: examinees with 
the faking instruction produced a higher mean score than 
when they were confronted with the neutral instruction. As 
a low score indicates a high degree of agreeableness, this 
result confirms the faking good phenomenon for the group 
with a dichotomous response format. However, given the 
analog scale response format, the resulting means of scores 
completely contradict this phenomenon. The interpretation 
of these results suggests that examinees have the tenden-
cy to evaluate themselves in a way that is in keeping with 
their character when rating themselves on the analog scale, 
whereas they deny having the respective attitude when con-
fronted only with the dichotomous question. This indicates 
an effective way of preventing faking good. One must, how-
ever, bear in mind that only a single scale happened to show 
a significant effect that supports this expectation.
METHODS
We attempted to replicate that experiment, primarily be-
cause one of four scales do not necessarily mean a general-
ized effect, but might be a matter of type-I-error. The hy-
pothesis is that rather the dichotomous response format than 
the analog scale response format brings an examinee to fake 
a personality questionnaire. A Big Five-like adjective list 
questionnaire, B5PO (Big Five Plus One Personality Inven-
tory; Holocher-Ertl, Kubinger, & Menghin, 2003), which 
encompasses an additional sixth scale “empathy,” was used. 
The experimental design and the instructions remained un-
altered. The population was again made up of psychology 
students. Sixty six 3rd year students were all tested at one 
time during a psychological assessment lecture. The test was 
presented as having a didactical purpose. There was no way 
out to complete the paper-and-pencil questionnaire. They 
were all advised three times to read the instruction carefully. 
Asking students after the test administration – again dur-
ing the psychological assessment lecture – whether they had 
actually tried to act according to the different instructions 
(but did not forget them while answering the questionnaire) 
proved that the experimental manipulation had prevailed; 
only two examinees did not raise one’s hand. 
RESULTS
Multivariate analysis of variance shows a significant 
main effect of instruction (Hotelling’s trace: p = .015), 
however, no significant interaction occurs between the in-
struction and response format (Hotelling’s trace: p = .732), 
and the significant main effect refers exclusively to the scale 
“agreeableness” (F = 7.841, p = .007). The difference in 
the means of the scores between the two groups with dif-
ferent instructions amounts to 1.02 by a standard deviation 
of 3.36, which is an estimated relative effect size of 0.30. 
The direction of mean difference confirms the faking good 
phenomenon.
DISCUSSION
This means that there is not only no general effect of the 
analog scale response format, but our experiment contradicts 
even Kubinger’s (2002) results: At the moment, the analog 
scale response format does not seem capable of prevent-
ing faking good in personality questionnaires. Yet though 
the estimated relative effect size is rather small and applies 
only to a single scale, faking good instruction is proven once 
more to work. 
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SOME BY-THE-WAY EXPERIMENT:  
The use of a large number of items
The relevant research topic of preventing faking good 
in personality questionnaires by using an analog scale re-
sponse format led to the question of whether fakeability is 
given in questionnaires for children as well. Seiwald (2002) 
investigated this question experimentally. Every child (10 
to 14 years) in the sample was given both response formats, 
which were randomized in such a way that the first half of 
all 210 items were in the dichotomous scale format and the 
second half were in the analog scale format or vice versa 
– the halves were balanced. Once again, a faking instruction 
was used; that is, a 2×2×2 design was applied. Apart from 
the unexpected fact that the children scored higher in terms 
of social desirability when using the analog scale response 
format but not in the case of the dichotomous response for-
mat (in 16 out of 17 scales), the analog scale also yielded 
higher average socially desired scores on items that were 
given in the first half of the questionnaire. Two possible ex-
planations are: Either children forget the faking instruction 
while answering the questionnaire (this would mean a seri-
ous objection to any experiment that uses a faking instruc-
tion), or children only get tired of giving socially desired 
answers if the number of items is very large.
As a consequence, a new hypothesis is now raised: Fak-
ing good may be prevented by a very large number of items, 
insofar as that the scores of the items at the end of a ques-
tionnaire correctly reflect the traits aimed to be measured. 
Hence, a second experiment was designed in order to 
test this hypothesis; it will be described further on in this ar-
ticle. There is, however, a third means of preventing faking 
good in personality questionnaires that should be reflected 
upon first.
EXPERIMENT II:  
The use of a warning instruction
Although Menghin and Kubinger (1996) have long es-
tablished that the use of a computer instead of test adminis-
tration in person does not have any effect on preventing fak-
ing good, the computer nevertheless offers the possibility 
of combating the faking good phenomenon on personality 
questionnaires. That is, apart from the known effect of some 
warning instructions (cf. Dwight & Donovan, 2003; McFar-
land, 2003; Vasilopoulos, Cucina, & McElreath, 2005), it 
is nowadays actually feasible to use the computer to cal-
culate whether any given answer of an examinee is likely 
or not: Psychometrics has developed certain person fit in-
dices originally intended to identify examinees who master 
a Rasch model fitting achievement test by improper means. 
This works by calculating the probability of an examinee’s 
actually solving a certain item, given his/her performance 
on previous items and given the item difficulty. In the mean-
time, this approach has been tested for the purpose of iden-
tifying examinees who fake a personality questionnaire (cf. 
Ponocny & Klauer, 2002). Whether or not this approach 
offers the ultimate solution to the problem of faking good, 
examinees may be leery of faking if they are made aware of 
this psychometric possibility of discovering that they have 
faked. Hypothetically speaking, most people believe in all 
kinds of computerized possibilities.  
In our case, we used the following warning instruction: 
“You will be given a large number of items to answer, be-
cause this enables the computer to check whether your an-
swers actually fit a realistic personality profile. This basical-
ly means that faking does not pay off. If faking is suspected, 
then you will be asked to work through the questionnaire 
again.” The experiment indicated in the previous chapter 
was designed in accordance with this warning instruction. 
METHOD
Firstly, a personality questionnaire was compiled that 
consisted of a large number of items, altogether 466 items, 
67 of which were repeated. Although all questionnaires and 
scales were from German editions, they resembled state of 
the art international personality questionnaires: FAF (“ag-
gression”; Hampel & Selg, 1975), FSKN (“self-esteem”; 
Deusinger, 1986), FKK (“locus of control of reinforcement”; 
Krampen, 1991), FBS (“tendency to commit suicide”; Stork, 
1972), PD-S (“paranoia” and “depression”; von Zerssen & 
Koeller, 1976), TPF (a 9-scales personality inventory based 
on the construct of psychical health; Becker, 1989). That is 
to say, all the questionnaires as a pool seem to be representa-
tive for all international questionnaires. 
A six category response format (graded from “complete-
ly true” to “completely false”) was used for all items except 
the very last 40, which were presented in the dichotomous 
response format and were all repeated items. In this experi-
ment, no faking instruction was given; the single experi-
mental factor was that an additional warning instruction was 
either given or not.  
The subjects were once again psychology students ful-
filling a test experience requirement for their course. The 
experiment was carried out in accordance with a type-I-risk 
of 5%, a type-II-risk of 20% and a relative effect of d = .80. 
For the (one-sided) t-test, CADEMO (cf. Rasch & Kubin-
ger, 2006) calculated a minimum sample size of n = 20 in 
each of the two independent experimental groups (with and 
without the given warning instruction). In effect, a total of 
39 students provided useful data. All answers were dichot-
omized. 
The main hypothesis was: “The warning instruction 
leads to a less socially desired mean of scores than is the 
case if the warning instruction is not given”.  This applies 
to the scale with the highest face-validity in terms of social 
desirability; it was decided that this scale should be “spon-
taneous aggression”. Of course, similar analyses with re-
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spect to the other scales were also carried out, but in order 
to fix the type-I-error, this single scale became the critical 
scale: This means that if the t-test results in significance, 
the warning instruction is proven to pay off; whether or not 
additional scales confirm this result is then of less impor-
tance. Conversely, if the t-test does not result in significance 
with respect to the scale “spontaneous aggression,” we need 
not look for other significances, because this would mean 
risking a high type-I-error. The interpretation of significant 
results might consequently be based on a statistical artifact. 
The hypothesis is restricted to the first half of the items due 
to the possibility that the mentioned effects of forgetting and 
tiredness do actually apply.   
The second hypothesis, concerning the effects of for-
getting and tiredness, is: “Questions administered twice, 
once at the beginning of the questionnaire and once again at 
the end, are answered in a less socially desired manner the 
second time around.” To test this hypothesis, a potentially 
changing response behavior should be measured item-wise; 
the hypothesis would be supported if changes from “com-
pletely true” to “completely untrue” and vice-versa are not 
balanced and if changes towards answering according to so-
cial desirability occur more frequently. The McNemar test 
may be applied to test significance by summing up changes 
counted from all items whose contents are judged as being 
most indicative of certain social desires.   
If the changes are considered separately for the groups 
with and without the warning instruction, then this compu-
tation also refers – although only descriptively – to the main 
hypothesis. If the number of changes indicating a tendency 
away from social desirability is larger in the group with the 
warning instruction than in the group without the warning 
instruction, then this instruction must have fulfilled its pur-
pose, though only at the beginning of the questionnaire.  
Finally, due to the fact that the repeated items are ad-
ministered with either a six-category response format or the 
dichotomous format at the very end of the questionnaire, the 
comparison of changes towards social desirability within 
both of these response formats would once again indicate 
whether the dichotomous format differs from other formats 
with respect to faking good.  
RESULTS
The result of the t-test, with regard to “spontaneous ag-
gression” was not significant (t = 1.58; df = 35; p = .123). 
The respective items are located on average at position 4.70 
to 5.02 – this tendency lies in accordance with the hypoth-
esis. For further information, see Table 1, in which the other 
scales positioned in the first half of the questionnaire are pre-
sented according to the comparison of their mean scores.
Table 2, below, shows the results according to the second 
hypothesis as follows: For every repeated item, the number 
of changes from “completely true” to “completely untrue” 
and vice-versa are given. This applies to both the overall 
sample as well as the two experimental groups, with and 
Table 1
Mean scores of scales from personality questionnaires in two experimental groups - one group with the warning instruction  
that faking good does not pay off and the other group without a warning instruction
Scale With warning instruction Without warning instruction Significance*
Spontaneous aggression 89.4 95.5 .123
Reactive aggression 57.1 59.3 .355
Excitability 52.4 51.0 .563
Self aggression/ depression 46.0 46.5 .869
Inhibition of aggression 35.9 34.8 .569
Control of behavior 58.9 58.9 .973
Psychological health 58.0 51.4 .147
Achievement of sense 36.9 37.2 .922
Self abandonment vs. self centered 33.6 33.3 .886
Freedom of complaints vs. anxiety 32.0 30.5 .605
Expansivity 37.2 33.9 .245
Autonomy 49.6 45.9 .234
Feeling of self-worth 33.6 31.3 .298
Ability to show affection 28.1 24.8 .095
Risk of suicide 115.1 138.2 .293
Note. *Significance according to the t-test.
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without the warning instruction. In cases where the content 
of an item cannot be judged in terms of any social desir-
ability, these items are set in brackets. If the relationship be-
tween changes from the first to the second response for the 
same item is in accordance with a tendency towards social 
desirability, this is also indicated. Finally, a row of summed 
counts is given for items whose contents are very likely to 
appeal to certain social desires. The sums of these counts 
were used to apply the McNemar test. 
The McNemar test resulted in significance (z = 2.6109; p 
= .0045). On the one hand, the corresponding effect of 57.1 
percent, instead of 50 percent, in favor of our hypothesis is 
neither impressive nor convincing. On the other hand, and 
more importantly, calculating the McNemar test for only 
those items that continued using the six-category response 
format for both administrations leads to a non-significant 
result. Over and above this, the changes go in the wrong 
direction (z = -0.6030). Therefore, the mentioned signifi-
cant effect only refers to those items whose response for-
mats were modified from the six-category response format 
to the dichotomous response format: z = 4.3989, the effect 
being a percentage of 67.3, instead of 50 percent, in favor of 
our hypothesis. This means that when the second time the 
dichotomous response format is used instead of the format 
with six categories, examinees give significantly more so-
cially desirable answers. Finally, in viewing the results in 
Table 2 from a qualitative perspective with respect to both 
experimental groups, no unequivocal tendency is disclosed. 
DISCUSSION
Firstly, the main hypothesis is not confirmed. Not a sin-
gle scale leads to a significant t-test. The non-significance 
with respect to the target scale (“spontaneous aggression”) 
implies that the warning instruction was not effective. This 
interpretation is supported by the evaluation of changes 
towards social desirability on the repeated items; there 
was evidently no difference between the two experimen-
tal groups. We are not of the opinion that this result had 
anything to do with the actual formulation of the warning 
instruction; nevertheless, we shall discuss the possibility of 
using warning instructions in order to prevent faking good 
in the next chapter. 
Secondly, the hypothesis that examinees get tired or 
give up faking good when administered with an “over-kill” 
number of items is also rejected. We do not believe that such 
an effect could be established if the number of items was in-
creased further, because 466 is already an almost unreason-
Table 2
Counted changes from “completely true” to “completely untrue” and vice-versa for a small sample  
of altogether 67 twice administered items
Position of  
the item Item Overall sample With warning instruction

























6 /untrue I quite honestly sometimes enjoy teasing other people. 4 0 1 0 3 0
12 (I am on my guard when I meet people who are friendlier than I expected.) 3 1 1 1 2 0
18 /untrue I sometimes picture how awful people who have done me wrong must feel. 8 2 4 0 4 2
32 /true I can not think of any valid reason for someone having to hit another person. 6 3 2 2 4 1
37 /untrue I openly admit to having tortured animals before. 2 0 0 0 2 0
… … … … … … … …
340 /untrue I find it difficult to represent a group when faced with a conflictive opinion. 7 3 4 2 3 1
380 /true I believe that I can justify my behavior in most cases. 6 6 4 4 2 2
382 /untrue I have difficulties doing what is right. 4 7 2 6 2 1
396 /true I am satisfied with myself. 3 4 3 1 0 3
Sum 193 145
Note. Bold numbers indicate that the relationship between changes from first to second response is in accordance with a tendency to answer in a socially 
desirable manner. The sums are given for both the overall sample, as well as for the samples with and without the warning instruction. Apart from the posi-
tion of the items at the first time of administration, the suggested answers which would correspond with social desirability are given.
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able number of items. In other words, this hypothesis should 
be completely disregarded in future. 
Thirdly, the dichotomous response format again showed 
itself to be disadvantageous with regard to the faking good 
phenomenon. It is obviously easiest to fake towards social 
desirability if the examinee is forced to choose only between 
two extreme answers. 
The main problem of research work on the phenome-
non of faking personality questionnaires is most certainly 
the kind of population from which the subjects are sam-
pled. Like this paper, many other studies and experiments 
use volunteers. It is, however, highly likely that volunteers 
behave quite differently than people who are tested within 
a job recruiting process; see for instance Birkeland et al. 
(2006) or, for a psychometrically stronger approach, Karner 
(2002): Using an ex-post-facto experiment comparing vol-
unteers and selection candidates, he disclosed that while the 
considered scales appear to stand Rasch model checks for 
voluntary subjects, i.e. they are all likely to measure unidi-
mensionally in this population, this is not at all the case for 
examinees in a selection scenario. Regardless of whether 
the response format is a dichotomous or an analog scale or 
whether the administration is carried out in person or by a 
computer, the items of the questionnaire fulfill psychomet-
ric presuppositions of a proper scale in the case of volun-
teers. In other words, personality questionnaires do their job 
well in the case of voluntary examinees; they however fail 
to measure fairly when consequences are involved for the 
examinee (cf. recently Morgeson et al., 2007b).   
Hence, experiments on potential ways of preventing fak-
ing good on personality questionnaires require a population 
of selection candidates rather than volunteers. Forthcom-
ing research should seriously take this into account. On the 
other hand, the irrelevance of results based on volunteers 
does give hope that a warning instruction may still work if 
selection candidates were to be tested.  
CONCLUSION
So far, all attempts to find a means of preventing or at 
least considerably reducing the faking good phenomenon in 
personality questionnaires have failed. There is some hope 
that an analog scale response format sometimes works to 
prevent this phenomenon. Yet there is hardly a hope that an 
“over-kill” number of items is effective. There is also only a 
small ray of hope that a warning instruction (that it is better 
not to fake) may work. Nevertheless, the demand is made on 
psychology to test new, different means that may possibly 
help to overcome the problem (for instance, recently Khor-
ramdel & Kubinger, 2006, investigated in particular the re-
spective effect of speededness). 
Of course, our results are restricted to volunteers (and 
the use of faking instruction); and we gave evidence that 
answering behavior changes considerably, depending on 
whether an examinee is a job applicant or merely a volun-
teer. Hence further research is needed concerning the rel-
evant population of selection candidates.
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